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Abstract
We set up a theoretical model to analyze the implications of coordination of
immigration policies among destination countries. The model contains two types of
spill-overs between destination countries: A terms of trade externality and a wel-
fare policy externality. We show that while coordination unambiguously increases
welfare of the destination countries, the eﬀects on the level of immigration and
on the income distribution of natives are ambiguous. Thus, coordination among
destination countries does not necessarily solve the global coordination problem of
inoptimally low levels of migration.
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1 Introduction
The potential world wide gains from liberalizing migration flows are enormous and have
been increasing in recent decades; see, e.g., Moses and Letnes (2004).1 Despite this
increase, the tendency in policies has been to restrict immigration; see, e.g., Boeri and
Brücker (2005) and Hatton (2007). This apparent paradox seems to call for coordination
of migration policies.
Reaping the full gains from migration requires coordination of migration policies
among the grand coalition of both source and destination countries, but as argued in
Hatton (2007) such coordination may be very diﬃcult to implement because the gains
from migration mainly accrue to the migrants themselves. However, there may also be a
case for coordination between destination countries alone, where particularly two types of
spill-overs — a terms-of trade externality and a welfare policy externality — may give rise
to coordination failures across national jurisdictions; see also Boeri and Brücker (2005).
Furthermore, coordination among destination countries is also the most likely policy sce-
nario in the case of, e.g., the European Union where such policy measures are currently
discussed; see, e.g., European Commission (2005).
The question is whether such (partial) coordination among destination countries will
give rise to more immigration and thus help solve the overall coordination problem be-
tween source and destination countries? And how does it aﬀect the welfare and income
distribution of the destination countries?
To answer these questions, we set up a theoretical model where immigrants are het-
erogenous with respect to their performance at the labor market. There are a number of
host countries which are able to choose their levels of immigration but not the specific
types of immigrants as this is private information of the immigrants. However, a country
can attract certain types of immigrants by oﬀering diﬀerent combinations of taxes, wages
and social benefits.
1Moses and Letnes (2004) analyse diﬀerent scenarios, but in a middle scenario they find that in 1977,
the gain from introducing free migration would be 7.5% of world GDP. In 1998, this number has increased
to 9.6%.
2
In our model, there are two types of spill-over eﬀects of immigration policy between
the destination countries. First, there is a terms of trade eﬀect. Immigration increases
host country production, and causes wages and prices to decrease in this country, which
in turn, gives rise to cheaper imports for other countries. This terms of trade externality
is a standard feature in analyses of fiscal policy coordination; see, e.g., Chari and Kehoe
(1990), Devereux (1991), Devereux and Mansoorian (1992), Dixon and Santoni (1997),
and Beetsma and Uhlig (1999). We show that this eﬀect is also in play when considering
immigration policy.
Second, destination countries can use fiscal policy to attract immigrants with high
employment rates, who will contribute to the financing of the welfare state. As this will
also aﬀect the composition of the immigrants flowing to other destination countries, it
creates a welfare policy externality. This type of externality is known from the literature
on fiscal competition among local governments; see, e.g., Wildasin (1991, 1994).
While coordination of immigration policies among destination countries always raises
the welfare of the destination countries, we find that it is ambiguous whether it gives
rise to more or less immigration than in the case of uncoordinated policies. Specifically,
we find that if the terms of trade externality of immigration dominates the welfare pol-
icy externality, coordination gives rise to more immigration. On the other hand, if the
dominating externality associated with immigration is the welfare policy externality, then
coordination of immigration policies actually reduces immigration.
Besides considering how coordination aﬀects the level of immigration, we also analyze
how coordination aﬀects the distribution of income in the destination countries. Again,
the results are in general ambiguous, but if immigrants have relatively low employment
rates and/or the terms of trade externality is the most important, people outside the labor
force will lose on coordination relatively to people in the labor force.
The implications for immigration and welfare of coordinating policies among a group
of destination countries have so far only received very limited attention in the literature.
One study is Hansen (2003) where the focus is on how immigration may aﬀect welfare
policies. He considers a political economy model where median voters in the destination
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countries may be aﬀected by the fiscal burden of welfare payments to immigrants. By
comparing uncoordinated, coordinated and leader-follower determined welfare policies, it
is shown that median voters (or populations in general) in rich countries will benefit from
coordination of welfare benefits, and that a position as a follower country is preferred by
the median voter to a position as a leader country, because of a less generous welfare sys-
tem and hence fewer immigrants. In the paper by Hansen (2003), the focus is on how the
coordination of welfare policies aﬀect immigration, whereas our focus is on coordination
of the immigration policies.
The issue of location choices made by immigrants is analyzed by, e.g., Borjas (1999)
who shows that interstate dispersion in welfare benefits in the US aﬀects the geograph-
ical clustering of low-skilled immigrants with immigrant welfare recipients more heavily
concentrated in states oﬀering high benefits.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we set up the model. The
model is solved and results are presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes. Technical
details and proofs of propositions are relegated to an appendix.
2 The Model
In this section we set up the model. In Subsection 2.1, we describe the basic macro-
economic model, which is a model of n symmetric destination countries each producing
a separate good which is traded among them. Two types of natives are present in the
economies — those in the labor force and those outside the labor force. The government
seeks to maximize a utilitarian welfare function defined over natives by deciding on immi-
gration and welfare policies (taxes and benefits) under the restriction of a balanced public
budget.
In Subsection 2.2, we describe the behavior of immigrants in response to the welfare
policies of the destination countries. We assume that destination countries can control
the number but not the type of immigrants — at least not perfectly. In Subsection 2.3,
we describe the resulting policy game between destination countries, in both the uncoor-
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dinated and the coordinated case, when they have to decide on optimal immigration and
welfare policies.
2.1 The Basic Model
We assume that there are n similar countries each producing one good which is an im-
perfect substitute in consumption for the n− 1 goods produced in the other countries.
The utility function of individual h in country i is given as:
Uhi = ln (Chi) + γ0N
I
i − γ1
¡
N Ii
¢2
, γ0 > 0, γ1 > 0, (1)
where Chi is a consumption index over the n goods. Note that the number of immigrants,
N Ii , in country i enters the utility function directly through the last two terms to capture
preferences for immigration not accounted for by the eﬀects on consumption possibilities.
This could be factors like cultural diversity, social/global responsibility, racism, etc.; see,
e.g., Dustman and Preston (2004), Hillman (2002) or Hansen (2003). We assume that
γ0 > 0 and γ1 > 0 meaning that this direct utility eﬀect of immigration is initially
positive, but eventually turns negative, as the marginal utility of immigrants is assumed
to be decreasing.2
The consumption index, Chi, is a CES function of the consumption of the n goods
produced by the n countries:3
Chi = n
1
1−θ
Ã
nX
j=1
c
θ−1
θ
hij
! θ
θ−1
(2)
We assume that θ > 1, i.e. the degree of substitutability between the goods is suﬃciently
high that no goods are essential in consumption.
Maximizing utility subject to an individual budget constraint, the demand for good j
2As we shall see, the specification of this part of the utility function is not crucial for the results, but
its presence can ensure the existence of interior solutions to the policy game described in Section 2.3.
3For simplicity, and without any implications for our results, the coeﬃcient, n 11−θ , is included in order
to avoid a "love of variety" eﬀect, which would complicate the analytics.
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of individual h in country i is given by:
chij =
µ
Pj
P
¶−θ
1
n
³zhi
P
´
(3)
where Pj is the price of good j, zhi is the after tax income of individual h in country i,
and P is a price index defined by:
P =
Ã
1
n
nX
j=1
P 1−θj
! 1
1−θ
(4)
which we in the following normalize to one, P = 1. The price elasticity of demand is −θ.
For simplicity, we assume that there is no disutility of working, and the labor supply,
lhi, of individual h in country i is exogenous. Specifically, lhi = 1 if a person is in the labor
force, and lhi = 0 for people outside the labor force.4 Those who participate in the labor
force receive the wage, wi, but they also pay taxes proportional to their wage income,
tiwi.
Now, inserting (3) in (2) yields Chi = zhi. As a consequence, the indirect utility of a
person in the labor force in country i is given by:
Vhi = ln ((1− ti)wi) + γ0N Ii − γ1
¡
N Ii
¢2
(5)
People outside the labor force receive social benefits, and we assume that the benefits
are proportional to the wage rate, biwi. Under this assumption, the indirect utility of a
person outside the labor force becomes:
Vhi = ln (biwi) + γ0N
I
i − γ1
¡
N Ii
¢2
(6)
4It is well known that taxes and benefits aﬀect labour force participation, but in order to focus on
immigration, we abstract from these eﬀects.
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In country i, the number of natives is Ni, and the labor supply of natives is Li:
Li = eNi (7)
where e is the average employment rate of natives, which is constant across all n countries.
If, for example, the number of old people or children is high in the destination countries,
e will be small. Similarly, the labor supply by immigrants in country i is given as LIi :
LIi = e
I
iN
I
i (8)
where eIi is the average employment rate of immigrants in country i.
At the production side of the economy, we simply assume that total production is
equal to the input of labor, i.e.:
Yi = Li + L
I
i (9)
Furthermore, assuming labor and goods markets to be competitive results in zero profits,
and total income in the economy is thus equal to total wage income, and wi = Pi, where
Pi is the price of the good produced in country i.
We assume that immigrants pay taxes and receive benefits like natives, i.e. they are
subject to the same taxation and benefit rules. Assuming that the public budget balances,
this implies that:
tiwi
¡
Li + L
I
i
¢
= biwi
¡
Ni − Li +N Ii − LIi
¢
(10)
By aggregating the demand for all consumers, and assuming that immigrants have
the same demand functions as natives, total (world) demand for good i — i.e. the good
produced in country i — becomes:
Ci = P
−θ
i
1
n
nX
j=1
PjYj (11)
where Yj is total production in country j, and PjYj is total real income of country j.
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Using that the (world) market for each good is assumed to clear, and that wi = Pi,
the equilibrium wage in country i becomes:
wi =
Ã
1
n
Pn
j=1
¡
wj
¡
L+ LIj
¢¢
L+ LIi
! 1
θ
(12)
We see that an increase in the labor supply in country i — due to immigration — lowers
the wage in country i (relative to the other countries), whereas an increase in the labor
supply in one of the other countries will raise the wage in country i.
Finally, we focus exclusively on the welfare of natives. In particular, since natives in
the destination countries decide on the immigration policy, we assume a utilitarian welfare
function in the utilities of natives only. This function is given by:
SWi = e ln ((1− ti)wi) + (1− e) ln (biwi) + γ0N Ii − γ1
¡
N Ii
¢2
(13)
as e is the share of natives in the labor force, and 1 − e is the share outside the labor
force.
2.2 Immigration
It is assumed that immigrants come from countries which do not trade with the n countries
in our model. This is at least partly consistent with the real world where for example
EU countries have much more internal trade than trade with potential source countries
of immigrants.
The destination countries decide upon the number of immigrants to accept, and, con-
sistent with the literature, we assume that the total number of potential immigrants is
suﬃciently large that the destination countries receive the number of immigrants which
they decide to let in. The immigrants, however, vary with respect to their labor market
performance. In particular, we assume that they vary with respect to their eventual em-
ployment rate in the destination countries. Furthermore, it is assumed that immigrants
respond to the policies in the destination countries; see also Borjas (1999). Thus, immi-
8
grants with high employment rates prefer destination countries where wages are high and
taxes are low, whereas immigrants with low employment rates prefer destination countries
where benefits are high.
As far as the destination countries have information concerning the eventual employ-
ment rates of immigrants, they would (in principle) be able to condition immigration on
these rates. The more interesting case, however, arises when destination countries are
unable to observe employment rates before immigration or otherwise unable to condition
immigration on these. To simplify the analysis, we assume that destination countries do
not have any information concerning the eventual employment rate of a specific immi-
grant before immigration is accepted. Alternatively, our results may be interpreted as if
the destination countries condition immigration on all available information concerning
the employment rate of immigrants, but this information is imperfect.
Specifically, we assume that the average employment rate of immigrants in country i
is given as:
eIi = f
µ
eI ,
biwi
b¯w¯
,
(1− ti)wi
(1− t¯) w¯
¶
, f ∈ [0, 1] (14)
where b¯w¯ and (1− t¯) w¯ are the average level of benefits and after tax wages, respectively,
in all other destination countries than country i, and eI is the average employment rate
of all potential immigrants.
If all destination countries pursue the same welfare policies, and gross wages are equal,
the average employment rate of immigrants will be the same in all destination countries:
f
¡
eI , 1, 1
¢
= eI (15)
Furthermore, we assume that:
f 02 ≤ 0 and f 03 ≥ 0 (16)
Thus, if bi is increased relative to b¯, there is a decrease in the employment rate of potential
immigrants to country i, as immigrants with low employment rates will tend to favour
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country i. In contrast, if country i increases the after tax rate, 1 − ti, relative to the
after tax rates in other destination countries, the average employment rate of potential
immigrants to country i increases, as immigrants with high employment rates will find
country i more attractive.
Finally, we shall assume that when biwi = b¯w¯ and (1− ti)wi = (1− t¯) w¯, the elastic-
ities of the employment rate, eIi , with respect to bi and 1 − ti are given by −α and α,
respectively:5
f 02
¡
eI , 1, 1
¢
= −α · eI (17)
f 03
¡
eI , 1, 1
¢
= α · eI (18)
2.3 Game Structure
The immigration policy as well as welfare policies in one country have implications for
other countries. Therefore, policy determination can be seen as a game between the
destination countries. Since our focus is on the implication of coordinating immigration
policies, we are going to consider two diﬀerent scenarios. A solution with uncoordinated
immigration policies and a solution where immigration policies are coordinated:
1. Uncoordinated policies: The countries simultaneously and unilaterally determine ti,
bi and Ni. The outcome is assumed to be a Nash equilibrium.
2. Coordinated immigration policies: First, all destination countries agree on a binding
level of immigration for all countries,N Ii = N
I , i = 1, ..., n. Thereafter, the countries
simultaneously and unilaterally determine ti and bi. The outcome of stage 2 is
assumed to be a Nash equilibrium.
5Allowing the elasticities w.r.t. bi and 1− ti to diﬀer would have no qualitative eﬀects on the results.
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3 Results
It is tedious but relatively straightforward to solve the model in the two cases, and,
therefore, the details concerning the solutions are relegated to an appendix. In the case
of uncoordinated policies, each country maximizes social welfare with respect to ti, bi and
N Ii — given immigration and welfare policies in the other countries.
6 The Nash equilibrium
is found by using that countries are symmetric, and, therefore, immigration and welfare
policies will be symmetric in equilibrium.
In the case of coordinated immigration policies, the model is solved in two stages by
applying backwards induction. First, we solve the second stage problem, where each coun-
try maximizes welfare with respect to taxes and benefits — given the level of immigration
as well as taxes and benefits in the other countries. By using symmetry, we find a Nash
equilibrium in taxes and benefits. Second, we solve the first stage problem where the
coordinated immigration policy is determined. This is done by maximizing the welfare of
a representative country with respect to a common level of immigration in all countries,
and using that taxes and benefits depend on immigration as found in the second stage.
See the appendix for details.
It turns out that the implications of coordinating immigration policies are in general
ambiguous. Therefore, we consider two special cases of the model which simplify the
analysis considerably, but are suﬃcient to illustrate the mechanisms of the model. In the
first case, we assume that immigrants do not respond to welfare policies in destination
countries. In equilibrium, this corresponds to assuming that α = 0 in (17)-(18). This
implies that the average employment rate of immigrants in all destination countries is
always eI , although this rate may be diﬀerent from the employment rate of natives.
In the second special case, we assume that the average employment rate of immigrants
is equal to the average employment rate of natives in the destination countries, eI = e, but
now the employment rate of immigrants to a particular destination country, eIi , depends
6In solving the optimization problem of country i, we assume that country i ignores the eﬀect that a
change in NIi has on world demand in (11). This is a standard assumption when the number of countries
is relatively large and simplifies the analytics considerably. Changing it would have no qualitative eﬀects
on the results.
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on the welfare policies of this country relative to other countries as specified in (14).
Throughout, we only consider parameter values for which interior solutions exist.7
3.1 Special Case 1
In this case, we assume that f 02 = f
0
3 = 0. That is, immigrants do not react to the welfare
policies of destination countries. By comparing the solutions of the model in the cases
of uncoordinated and coordinated policies, we find the results reported in the following
proposition, where superscripts "U" and "C" refer to the outcomes under uncoordinated
and coordinated policies, respectively:
Proposition 1 If f 02 = f
0
3 = 0, then:
N IU < N IC
tU = tC
bU R bC if e R eI
SWU < SWC
Proof: See appendix.
In this case, coordination of immigration policies always gives rise to more immigration.
This is so because immigration into one country leads to a deterioration of the terms of
trade of this country. In the case of coordinated immigration policies, this terms of trade
externality (or spill-over) is neutralized, and the implication is an increase in the level of
immigration. Since the concern for the terms of trade eﬀect restrains immigration in the
case of uncoordinated policies, social welfare increases as a result of coordination.
We also see that the level of social benefits depends on whether or not immigration
policies are coordinated. If the employment rate of immigrants is lower than the em-
ployment rate of natives, eI < e, the higher immigration under coordination implies that
7Note that the existence of interior solutions can be ensured by appropriate choices of γ0 and γ1.
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there is a decrease in social benefits, bC < bU , and vice versa if the employment rate of
immigrants is higher than the employment rate of natives. There are two reasons why
a lower employment rate of immigrants gives rise to lower benefits. First, with eI < e,
immigrants are more costly for the public sector than natives which implies that social
benefits must be diminished. This is a kind of income eﬀect. Second, since social welfare
only depends on the income of natives, it is optimal to shift some income from recipients
of social benefits (where the share of immigrants is relatively high) to income for tax
payers (where the share of immigrants is relatively low). This is a kind of substitution
eﬀect.
The tax rate does not depend on whether immigration policies are coordinated. This
is a result of two counteracting eﬀects on the tax level. First, if eI < e, immigrants are
more costly for the public sector, which tends to increase taxes. Second, when eI < e,
the share of immigrants is relatively low among tax payers, which tends to decrease taxes
for the same reason as benefits are lowered in this case (see above). In the model these
two eﬀects are quantitatively of the exact same size implying that taxes are unaﬀected
by immigration policies being coordinated rather than uncoordinated. When e < eI , the
same intuition applies with opposite eﬀects.
Finally, coordination of immigration policies aﬀects the income distribution since social
benefits are aﬀected whereas taxes are unchanged. If the employment rate of immigrants
is lower than the employment rate of natives, the receivers of social benefits will tend to
lose on coordination as benefits are lower,8 whereas they will gain more than others if
the employment rate of immigrants is higher than the employment rate of natives. That
natives with characteristics similar to those of immigrants tend to lose (relatively) on
immigration is a well-known result from the literature on labor market eﬀects of immi-
gration; see, e.g., Borjas (2003) and Zorlu and Hartog (2005). Typically, however, the
loss comes about through lower wages or displacement eﬀects, as immigrants compete
with similar natives for jobs. In the present case, the reason is somewhat diﬀerent, as
8Despite lower benefits, they may in fact gain on coordination through a larger direct utility from
immigration.
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the natives most similar to the immigrants lose on more immigration and hence coordina-
tion because benefits and taxes are changed to optimally target the groups where natives
dominate.
3.2 Special Case 2
In this case, we assume that the average employment rate of immigrants equals the average
employment rate of natives, eI = e, but the employment rate of immigrants to a particular
country depends on the policy in that country as given by (14). This introduces an
additional externality (or spill-over) between the countries — a welfare policy externality.
By solving the model under these assumptions, we find the results reported in the
following proposition:
Proposition 2 If eI = e, there exist a value θˆ such that:
1. If θ < θˆ, then:
N IU < N IC
tU > tC
bU > bC
SWU < SWC
2. If θ > θˆ, then:
N IU > N IC
tU < tC
bU < bC
SWU < SWC
Proof: See appendix.
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If the price elasticity of demand is low, θ < θˆ, the terms of trade externality is the
dominating externality, and coordination of immigration policies then still gives rise to an
increase in immigration. As in Proposition 1, the reason is that the terms of trade eﬀect
is neutralized in the case of coordinated policies.
When θ increases, the importance of the terms of trade externality becomes smaller.
This implies that immigration in the uncoordinated case increases towards the coordinated
level. However, the increase in θ will also intensify fiscal competition for immigrants in
both the uncoordinated and the coordinated cases as the negative wage eﬀects of this fiscal
competition are now smaller.9 This competition is socially inoptimal since in equilibrium,
the distribution of immigrants is unchanged, but natives outside the labor force have
been hurt by the fiscal competition (a distributional cost). This in turn leads to less
immigration in the case of coordinated policies, as less immigration will serve to reduce
this fiscal competition. That less immigration will reduce fiscal competition follows from
the fact that with less immigration, the distributional costs for natives of using fiscal
competition are relatively higher. Consequently, when θ > θˆ, the welfare policy externality
is dominating, and the destination countries agree on less immigration in the coordinated
case to diminish the increased socially inoptimal fiscal competition.
Under the condition that the terms of trade eﬀect is dominating, θ < θˆ, the higher im-
migration under coordination implies that there will be more competition over attracting
immigrants with a high employment rate, and, therefore, taxes and benefits will be lower.
With respect to social welfare, there are two counteracting eﬀects. On the one hand,
there is more immigration, and since the level of immigration tends to be ineﬃciently low
for uncoordinated policies, this tends to imply that social welfare is higher in the case of
coordinated policies. On the other hand, the more severe competition in welfare policies,
due to coordination, tends to decrease welfare. Since coordination can always do at least
as good as the the uncoordinated outcome, the former eﬀect dominates. Furthermore,
since taxes as well as benefits are lower in the case of coordinated policies, there is an un-
9Fiscal competition has negative terms of trade (wage) eﬀects because it increase the labour supply
of immigrants for a given level of immigration.
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ambiguous eﬀect on the income distribution in the destination countries. The tax payers
are going to gain on coordination, whereas the receivers of benefits are going to lose.
If the welfare policy externality is dominating, θ > θˆ, the level of immigration is lower
under coordinated policies. This implies that taxes and social benefits are higher in the
coordinated case than in the uncoordinated case. Again these are two counteracting eﬀects
on welfare, but in this case, the latter dominates, which results in higher welfare under
coordination. Furthermore, the eﬀects on the income distribution from coordination is
now reversed compared to the situation with θ < θˆ: The reduced fiscal competition under
coordination benefits the recipients of benefits while harming the tax payers.
4 Conclusion
We have considered the implications of coordination of immigration policies among a
group of destination countries in a model with two types of externalities between these
countries — a terms of trade externality and a welfare policy externality.
We find that coordination unambiguously increases social welfare in destination coun-
tries. The reason is that coordination internalizes (some of) the externalities from immi-
gration policies. However, it is ambiguous whether coordination gives rise to more or less
immigration and thus helps to solve the overall coordination problem between source and
destination countries.
If the terms of trade externality is dominating, coordination induces more immigration,
as coordination internalizes this externality. However, if the welfare policy externality is
the dominating externality, coordination reduces immigration. The reason is that coordi-
nation of immigration policies cannot fully internalize the welfare policy externality, but
as a second best response, the coordinating countries choose to reduce immigration to
minimize the socially harmful fiscal competition.
Therefore, as far as the level of immigration is too low as seen in a more global
perspective where we also take the welfare of citizens in the source countries into account,
coordination of immigration policies among destination countries may give rise to both
16
higher and lower world wide welfare.
Finally, coordination of immigration policies also aﬀect the income distributions in the
destination countries, i.e. the distribution of income between people in the labor force
and people outside the labor force. The latter will lose on coordination if: i) immigrants
have relatively low employment rates, in which case public policy will be directed towards
the relatively more important group of tax payers under a coordinated outcome; and/or
ii) the price elasticity of demand is low, in which case they will become the victims of an
increased immigration and associated tax competition in a coordinated regime.
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A Solving the Policy Game
In Subsection A.1, we solve the policy game in the case of uncoordinated immigration
policies. We first derive (indirect) solutions for the general model, and then provide more
explicit solutions for the two special cases considered in the paper. Similarly, Subsection
A.2 provides solutions for the case of coordinated policies. Throughout, we assume that
parameter values are such that interiour solutions exist.
A.1 Uncoordinated Policies
In the case of uncoordinated policies, each country maximizes social welfare given immi-
gration and welfare policies in the other countries. We assume that the countries simulta-
neously and unilaterally determine the benefit level, tax rate and number of immigrants.
That is, country i maximizes:
SWi = e ln ((1− ti)wi) + (1− e) ln (biwi) + γ0N Ii − γ1
¡
N Ii
¢2
(A1)
with respect bi, ti and N Ii , and subject to the public budget constraint:
tiwi
¡
Li + L
I
i
¢
= biwi
¡
Ni − Li +N Ii − LIi
¢
(A2)
where eIi is given by (14), and taking as given the choices of the n− 1 other countries.
The solution to this optimization problem can be found by use of the Lagrangian:
Li = e ln (1− ti) + (1− e) ln bi + lnwi + γ0N Ii − γ1
¡
N Ii
¢2
−λ ((xi − 1) bi − ti) (A3)
where xi =
¡
Ni +N
I
i
¢
/
¡
Li + L
I
i
¢
and λ is the Lagrange multiplier. The first-order
conditions of (A3) with respect to bi, ti, N Ii and λ are given by:
∂Li
∂bi
=
1− e
bi
+
1
wi
∂wi
∂bi
− λ
µ
∂xi
∂bi
bi + (xi − 1)
¶
= 0 (A4)
∂Li
∂ti
= − e
1− ti
+
1
wi
∂wi
∂ti
− λ
µ
∂xi
∂ti
bi − 1
¶
= 0 (A5)
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∂Li
∂N Ii
=
1
wi
∂wi
∂N Ii
− λ ∂xi
∂N Ii
bi + γ0 − 2γ1N Ii = 0 (A6)
∂Li
∂λ
= − (xi − 1) bi + ti = 0 (A7)
with:
∂wi
∂bi
= −
wif
0
2
³
eI , biwi
b¯w¯
,
(1−ti)wi
(1−t¯)w¯
´
wiN
I
i
θYib¯w¯
(A8)
∂xi
∂bi
= −
¡
Ni +N
I
i
¢
f
0
2
³
eI , biwi
b¯w¯
,
(1−ti)wi
(1−t¯)w¯
´
wiN
I
i
Y 2i b¯w¯
(A9)
∂wi
∂ti
=
wif
0
3
³
eI , biwi
b¯w¯
,
(1−ti)wi
(1−t¯)w¯
´
wiN
I
i
θYi (1− t¯) w¯
(A10)
∂xi
∂ti
=
¡
Ni +N
I
i
¢
f
0
3
³
eI , biwi
b¯w¯
,
(1−ti)wi
(1−t¯)w¯
´
wiN
I
i
Y 2i (1− t¯) w¯
(A11)
∂wi
∂N Ii
= −
wif
³
eI , biwi
b¯w¯
,
(1−ti)wi
(1−t¯)w¯
´
θYi
(A12)
∂xi
∂N Ii
=
Yi −
¡
Ni +N
I
i
¢
f
³
eI , biwi
b¯w¯
,
(1−ti)wi
(1−t¯)w¯
´
Y 2i
(A13)
Using that policies and the equilibrium more generally are symmetric across countries,
i.e. bi = b¯ = b, ti = t¯ = t, N Ii = N
I , wi = w¯ = w, and Yi = Y , we can rewrite (A8)-(A13)
as:
∂w
∂b
=
wαLI
θY b
(A14)
∂x
∂b
=
¡
N +N I
¢
αLI
Y 2b
(A15)
∂w
∂t
=
wαLI
θY (1− t) (A16)
∂x
∂t
=
¡
N +N I
¢
αLI
Y 2 (1− t) (A17)
∂w
∂N I
= −we
I
θY
(A18)
∂x
∂N I
=
Y −
¡
N +N I
¢
eI
Y 2
(A19)
By substituting (A14)-(A19) into (A4)-(A7), and after some manipulations, we get the
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following four equations, which determine the equilibrium valus of t, b, N I and λ:
1− e
b
+
αLI
θY b
− λ
Ã¡
N +N I
¢
αLI
Y 2
+ (x− 1)
!
= 0 (A20)
− e
1− t +
αLI
θY (1− t) − λ
Ã¡
N +N I
¢
αLI
Y 2 (1− t) b− 1
!
= 0 (A21)
− e
I
θY
− λ
Ã
Y −
¡
N +N I
¢
eI
Y 2
b
!
+ γ0 − 2γ1N I = 0 (A22)
− (x− 1) b+ t = 0 (A23)
In the general case, it is not possible to solve this system of equations more explicitly
for the equilibrium values of b, t and N I . To do this, we consider two special cases of the
model.
A.1.1 Special Case 1
In the first special case, α = 0. That is, we assume that immigrants do not respond
to welfare policies in destination countries. In this case, (A20)-(A23) above yield the
following expressions:
1− e
b
− λ (x− 1) = 0 (A24)
− e
1− t + λ = 0 (A25)
− e
I
θY
− λ
Ã
Y −
¡
N +N I
¢
eI
Y 2
b
!
+ γ0 − 2γ1N I = 0 (A26)
− (x− 1) b+ t = 0 (A27)
From (A24)-(A27), it is now possible to derive the equilibirum benefit level, tax rate and
number of immigrants (the latter only indirectly) in destination country i in the case of
uncoordinated policies:
bU =
1− e
x− 1 (A28)
tU = 1− e (A29)
N IU =
γ0 − e
I
θY
− (1−e)(e−e
I)N
Y [(1−e)N+(1−eI)NIU ]
2γ1
(A30)
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A.1.2 Special Case 2
In the second special case, we assume that the average employment rate of immigrants is
equal to the average employment rate of natives in the destination countries, i.e. eI = e.
Using this assumption, the general solutions in (A20)-(A23) becomes:
1− e
b
+
αN I
θb (N +N I)
− λ
µ
αN I + (x− 1)Y
Y
¶
= 0 (A31)
− e
1− t +
αN I
θ (N +N I) (1− t) − λ
µ
αN Ib− Y (1− t)
Y (1− t)
¶
= 0 (A32)
− 1
θ (N +N I)
+ γ0 − 2γ1N I = 0 (A33)
− (x− 1) b+ t = 0 (A34)
Solving (A31)-(A34) with respect to b, t and N I gives the following expressions for the
benefit level, tax rate and number of immigrants (the latter only indirectly) in destination
country i:
bU =
(1− e) θY + αN IUe
θ (αN IU + (x− 1)Y ) (A35)
tU =
(x− 1)
£
(1− e) θY + αN IUe
¤
θ (αN IU + (x− 1)Y ) (A36)
N IU =
γ0
2γ1
− 1
2γ1θ (N +N
IU)
(A37)
A.2 Coordinated Policies
In the case of coordinated immigration policies, the model is solved in two stages by
applying backwards induction. First, we solve the second stage, where each country
maximizes welfare with respect to benefits and taxes (bi and ti) given the coordinated
level of immigration into each country (N Ii = N
I) as well as benefits, taxes and wages in
the other countries. Then, given the equilibrium in the second stage, we solve the first
stage by maximizing the welfare of a representative country with respect to a common
level of immigration in all countries (N I), using that the equilibrium values of benefits
and taxes depend on immigration as found in the second stage.
Starting at the second stage, we use (A3) — and the assumption of a common level of
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immigration in all countries — to write the Lagrangian of the second stage optimization
problem as:
Li = e ln (1− ti) + (1− e) ln bi + lnwi + γ0N I − γ1
¡
N I
¢2
(A38)
−λ ((x− 1) bi − ti)
where xi =
¡
Ni +N
I
i
¢
/
¡
Li + L
I
i
¢
and λ is the Lagrange multiplier.. The first order
conditions of (A38) with respect to bi, ti and λ are now:
∂Li
∂bi
=
1− e
bi
+
1
wi
∂wi
∂bi
− λ
µ
∂xi
∂bi
bi + (xi − 1)
¶
= 0 (A39)
∂Li
∂ti
= − e
1− ti
+
1
wi
∂wi
∂ti
− λ
µ
∂xi
∂ti
bi − 1
¶
= 0 (A40)
∂Li
∂λ
= − (xi − 1) bi + ti = 0 (A41)
with:
∂wi
∂bi
= −
wif
0
2
³
eI , biwi
b¯w¯
,
(1−ti)wi
(1−t¯)w¯
´
wiN
I
i
θYib¯w¯
(A42)
∂xi
∂bi
= −
¡
Ni +N
I
i
¢
f
0
2
³
eI , biwi
b¯w¯
,
(1−ti)wi
(1−t¯)w¯
´
wiN
I
i
Y 2i b¯w¯
(A43)
∂wi
∂ti
=
wif
0
3
³
eI , biwi
b¯w¯
,
(1−ti)wi
(1−t¯)w¯
´
wiN
I
i
θYi (1− t¯) w¯
(A44)
∂xi
∂ti
=
¡
Ni +N
I
i
¢
f
0
3
³
eI , biwi
b¯w¯
,
(1−ti)wi
(1−t¯)w¯
´
wiN
I
i
Y 2i (1− t¯) w¯
(A45)
Using symmetry across countries, we rewrite (A42)-(A45) as:
∂w
∂b
=
wαLI
θY b
(A46)
∂x
∂b
=
¡
N +N I
¢
αLI
Y 2b
(A47)
∂w
∂t
=
wαLI
θY (1− t) (A48)
∂x
∂t
=
¡
N +N I
¢
αLI
Y 2 (1− t) (A49)
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By substituting (A46)-(A49) into (A39)-(A41), we get the following equations:
1− e
b
+
αLI
θY b
− λ
Ã¡
N +N IC
¢
αLI
Y 2
+ (x− 1)
!
= 0 (A50)
− e
1− t +
αLI
θY (1− t) − λ
Ã¡
N +N IC
¢
αLI
Y 2 (1− t) b− 1
!
= 0 (A51)
− (x− 1) b+ t = 0 (A52)
Again, we cannot derive more explicit solutions for b and t (and N I in the first stage) in
the general case. Instead, we consider the two special cases of the model.
A.2.1 Special Case 1
Assuming that α = 0, we can easily derive the benefit level and tax rate from (A50)-(A52)
in the case of coordinated policies:
bC =
1− e
x− 1 (A53)
tC = 1− e (A54)
Given these benefits and taxes, we can then solve the first stage of the model by maxi-
mizing the social welfare in a representative country with respect to a common level of
immigration. Formally, we insert (A53) and (A54) into the social welfare function. This
gives the expression:
SWi = e ln (e) + (1− e) ln
µ
1− e
x− 1
¶
+ γ0N
I − γ1
¡
N I
¢2
(A55)
Now, the representative country chooses N I to maximize (A55). After some manipula-
tions, this gives the following (indirect) expression for the optimal level of immigration in
the first stage of the model:
N IC =
γ0 −
(1−e)(e−eI)N
Y [(1−e)N+(1−eI)NIC ]
2γ1
(A56)
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A.2.2 Special Case 2
In the second case, we assume that eI = e. This results in the following expressions for b
and t:
bC =
(1− e) θY + αN ICe
θ (αN IC + (x− 1)Y ) (A57)
tC =
(x− 1)
£
(1− e) θY + αN ICe
¤
θ (αN IC + (x− 1)Y ) (A58)
Using the same procedure as in the special case above, we insert (A57) and (A58) into
the social welfare function, which can then be written as:
SWi = e ln
Ã
θαN I − (x− 1)
¡
θY e+ αN Ie
¢
θ (αN I + (x− 1)Y )
!
+ (1− e) ln
µ
(1− e) θY + αN Ie
θ (αN I + (x− 1)Y )
¶
+ γ0N
I − γ1
¡
N I
¢2
(A59)
To derive the number of immigrants, the representative country chooses N I in the first
stage of the model to maximize (A59), which — after some manipulations — results in the
following level of immigration:
N IC =
γ0
2γ1
+
αN (θ − 1) (1− e)2 e (B − A)
2γ1AB [αN
IC + (x− 1)Y ] (A60)
where A = αN IC (θ − (1− e)) + eθ (x− 1)Y and B = (1− e) θY + αN ICe.
B Proofs of Propositions
Subsection B.1 contains a proof of Proposition 1 in the paper, whereas Subsection B.2
provides a proof of Proposition 2 from the paper.
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 from the paper states:
Proposition 3 If α = 0, then:
N IU < N IC
tU < tC
bU R bC if e R eI
SWU < SWC
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Proof. From the coordinated solution, we have the following first-order condition (by
diﬀerentiation of (A55) with respect to N I):
∂SW
∂N I
= γ0 −
(1− e)
¡
e− eI
¢
N
Y [(1− e)N + (1− eI)N I ] − 2γ1N
I = 0 (A61)
for N I = N IC , where Y = eN + eIN I . Furthermore, the second order condition yields:
∂2SW
∂ (N I)2
=
(1− e)
¡
e− eI
¢
N
Y [(1− e)N + (1− eI)N I ]
∙
eI
Y
+
1− eI
(1− e)N + (1− eI)N I
¸
−2γ1N I < 0 (A62)
for N I = N IC . Since the first term is decreasing (numerically) in N I but does not change
sign as N I increases above N IC , it follows that the second derivative is negative for all
N I ≥ N IC . This in turn implies that:
γ0 −
(1− e)
¡
e− eI
¢
N
Y [(1− e)N + (1− eI)N I ] − 2γ1N
I ≤ 0 (A63)
for all N I ≥ N IC .
The first-order condition for N I from the uncoordinated solution is:
γ0 −
(1− e)
¡
e− eI
¢
N
Y [(1− e)N + (1− eI)N I ] − 2γ1N
I =
eI
θY
(A64)
We know from above that the left hand side is non-positive for N I ≥ N IC . Since the
right hand side is always positive, it follows that N IU < N IC . This proves the first part
of Proposition 1.
The second part of Proposition 1, tU = tC , follows directly from (A29) and (A54).
Furthermore, from the expressions for b in (A28) and (A53), it follows that:
∂b
∂N I
=
(1− e)
¡
eI − e
¢
N
[(1− e)N + (1− eI)N I ]2
(A65)
and hence that ∂b
∂NI R 0 if eI R e. Combined with N IU < N IC , this proves the third part
of Proposition 1.
The final part of Proposition 1 is proved by noticing that, since the expressions for
optimal choices of b and t as functions of N I are identical in the two policy cases, the
uncoordinated solution can always be attained in the coordinated case. Since a diﬀerent
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solution is in fact chosen in the coordinated case, N IC is revealed preferred to N IU , and
it therefore follows that SWU < SWC .
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2 from the paper states:
Proposition 4 If eI = e, there exist θˆ such that:
1. If θ < θˆ, then:
N IU < N IC
tU > tC
bU > bC
SWU < SWC
2. If θ > θˆ, then:
N IU > N IC
tU < tC
bU < bC
SWU < SWC
Proof. The proof of the part concerning N I contains the following three steps:
1. First, we show that when θ → 1, then N IU < γ0
2γ1
and N IC = γ0
2γ1
, which means that
N IU < N IC when θ = 1.
2. Second, we show that when θ →∞, then N IU = γ0
2γ1
and N IC < γ0
2γ1
, which means
that N IU > N IC when θ =∞.
3. To show uniqueness of θˆ, it is suﬃcient to show that ∂N
IU
∂θ
> 0 and ∂N
IC
∂θ
< 0. Then
we know that N IC and NUC can only cross once (at θˆ).
Re. 1: Consider equations (A37) and (A60) derived in the second special case of the
model:
N IU =
γ0
2γ1
− 1
2γ1θ (N +N
IU)
(A66)
N IC =
γ0
2γ1
+
αN (θ − 1) (1− e)2 e (B − A)
2γ1AB [αN
IC + (x− 1)Y ] (A67)
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where A = αN IC (θ − (1− e)) + eθ (x− 1)Y and B = (1− e) θY + αN ICe.
By setting θ = 1, we obtain the following expressions for the level of immigration in
case of uncoordinated and coordinated policies, respectively:
N IU =
γ0
2γ1
− 1
2γ1 (N +N
IU)
<
γ0
2γ1
(A68)
N IC =
γ0
2γ1
(A69)
from which follows that N IU < N IC when θ = 1.
Re. 2: In the second step of the proof, we assume that θ → ∞. Substituting this
assumption into (A66), the level of immigration for uncoordinated policies becomes:
N IU =
γ0
2γ1
(A70)
In the case of coordinated policies, we can rewrite (A67) as:
N IC =
γ0
2γ1
+
αNe (1− e)2
h
(1−1/θ)
(1−e)Y+αNIC(e/θ+1−1/θ) −
(1−1/θ)
(1−e)Y+αNICe/θ
i
2γ1 [αN
IC + (x− 1)Y ] (A71)
Now, by for θ →∞, (A71) becomes:
N IC =
γ0
2γ1
+
αNe (1− e)2
h
1
(1−e)Y+αNIC −
1
(1−e)Y
i
2γ1 [αN
IC + (x− 1)Y ] <
γ0
2γ1
(A72)
Comparing (A70) and (A72), it follows that N IU > N IC when θ =∞.
Re. 3: In the third step, to show uniqueness of θˆ we need, as described above, to prove
that ∂N
IU
∂θ
> 0 and ∂N
IC
∂θ
< 0. The first requirement is proved by diﬀerentiating (A37)
with respect to θ:
∂N IU
∂θ
=
1
2γ1θ
2 (N +N IU)
(A73)
implying that ∂N IU/∂θ > 0. Second, to show that ∂N IC/∂θ < 0, the first order condition
of (A60) with respect to N IC , in case of coordinated policies, can be written as:
γ0 − 2γ1N IC + F
¡
θ,N IC
¢
= 0 (A74)
where:
F
¡
θ,N IC
¢
=
αNe (1− e)2 (θ − 1)
h
1
θ(1−e)Y+αNIC(e+θ−1) −
1
θ(1−e)Y+αNICe
i
αN IC + (x− 1)Y < 0 (A75)
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Furthermore, the second-order condition of (A60) yields:
−2γ1 + F 0NI
¡
θ,N IC
¢
< 0 (A76)
Now, from total diﬀerentiation of (A74) we get:
∂N IC
∂θ
=
F 0θ
¡
θ,N IC
¢
2γ1 − F 0NI (θ,N IC)
(A77)
where the denominator is positive by the second-order condition of (A76). Furthermore,
we can show that F 0θ
¡
θ,N IC
¢
< 0 by diﬀerentiation of (A75) with respect to θ:
F 0θ
¡
θ,N I
¢
=
D
θ2
"
1
(1− e)Y + αN Ie/θ + αN I
¡
1− 1
θ
¢ − 1
(1− e)Y + αN Ie/θ
#
−D
µ
1− 1
θ
¶
αN I/θ2
Ã
1
(1− e)Y + αN Ie/θ + αN I
¡
1− 1
θ
¢!2
+D
µ
1− 1
θ
¶¡
αN Ie/θ2
¢⎡⎢⎣
µ
1
(1−e)Y+αNIe/θ+αNI(1− 1θ )
¶2
−
³
1
(1−e)Y+αNIe/θ
´2
⎤
⎥⎦ < 0 (A78)
where D = αNe(1−e)
2
αNI+(x−1)Y . Thus, ∂N
IC/∂θ < 0, which concludes the proof concerning N I
From the expressions for t in (A36) and (A58), it follows that:
∂t
∂N I
=
αNθ (1− e)2 (1− θ)
[θ (αN I + (x− 1)Y )]2
< 0 (A79)
Combined with N IU < N IC when θ < θˆ, and vice versa when θ > θˆ, this proves the part
of Proposition 2 that concerns t.
Similarly, from the equations (A35) and (A57), it follows that:
∂b
∂N I
=
αNθe (1− e) (1− θ)
[θ (αN I + (x− 1)Y )]2
< 0 (A80)
Combined with N IU < N IC when θ < θˆ, and vice versa when θ > θˆ, this proves the part
of Proposition 2 that concerns b.
The final part of Propositon 2 is proved by noticing that, since the expressions for
optimal choices of b and t as functions of N I are identical in the two policy cases, the
uncoordinated solution can always can be attained in the case of coordinated policies.
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However, since diﬀerent solutions are chosen in the uncoordinated case (depending on
θ R θˆ), N IC is revealed preferred to N IU , and it therefore follows that SWU < SWC in
both cases.
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